This post was mentioned on Twitter by PubSecBloggers: ONS: where next for the Census?: I dont get this. The 2011 Census will adopt a similar processing strategy to that… http://bit.ly/dqW5pF...

“But here is another thing I’ve found in this Job Centre, and it is something I’m not surprised about.

Staff build their own stuff to get around the limitations of systems we provide. There are Excel based spreadsheets which are used for diary management (“oh, I can’t have this open too long, otherwise no-one else will be able to make appointments”). There is email based workflow, where each step is a new inbox that gets manually monitored. And there’s any number of self-made data capturing things that are used for statistics and business reporting.

And all of it is stitched together with another technology: paper. They create their own forms, and their own paper based systems in order to supplement their jobs.

Consequently, the work is processed in a highly efficient way. I’d make a guess that each JobCentre does things slightly differently, depending on how good their custom additions to each of our centrally provided processes are.

If there was ever proof needed that decentralisation of the core is a good thing, then I’ve been immersed in it for the week so far.

I wonder what would happen if we put the appropriate end-user computing tools in the hands of these people and said “design the perfect Job Centre system”. My guess would be something good.”

Having been involved in the peripheries of Big Projects in the past, I’ve often wondered if the reason that they fail is linked to their sheer size and the capacity of an ordinary human being to cope with the scale. Beyond a certain size, it seems that the probability of success by any definition tends to zero, and no amount of tinkering with the political complexions or terminology or methodology-of-the-month will change that.

This post was mentioned on Twitter by williamheath: http://idealgovernment.com/2010/02/idealgits-where-have-we-got-to/ #idealgits…

All it will take is a service like Pachube being fed by say Tracker or other in-car GPS devices and you could provide a real time map of UK traffic speeds and road utilization.

There are a couple of iPhone Apps that are acquiring public data to be shared:

Potholes And Repairs? Boston Has An App For That (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120999393)

Track Those Tax Dollars In An ‘Augmented Reality’ (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114359604)

If the government don’t do it, the private sector will find a way.

2 Oct 09

Dear Helen Bray

Thank you for your letter. I’m still uneasy about this and have sought advice.

The immediate advice is that that your letter is disingenuous, in that it refers to the duty of confidentiality but fails to mention the extensive loopholes available in the Statistics & Registration Service Act 2007. I was unaware of these. I’m sure you know them well; they are set out in s.39 copied below.

What they appear to say is that personally-identifiable census data can be made available, inter alia:

- if *any* law either expressly allows the disclosure, or even just *permits* it. This is extremely wide: there is no balancing of the privacy rights of the individual against whatever purpose any law may serve, and no requirement that the disclosure is “necessary” to serve an important public interest under such a law.

- if the disclosure is “made for the purposes of a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings (whether or not in the United Kingdom)”. This is separate from the previous exemption, so the police (and, no doubt others – HMRC? DWP? local authorities) dont even need a law to point to in relying on this exemption. Again there is no balancing at all: the disclosure need not be “necessary” for the investigation; it is enough that (the authority claims that) the data are to be used/useable for this purpose.

- if the disclosure is to the intelligence services, “in the interests of national security” (again, as defined by them, and without any “necessity” test).

- if the disclosure is to an “approved researcher” (subject to “criteria” to be drawn up by the board). Who are these people?

These rules do not seem to stand in the way of – indeed, almost seem to invite – the use of the census data for “profiling” purposes, by the police and the intelligence services.

I cannot see how surrendering the amount of sensitive data you will ask for in the census can be compatible with my right under European data protection law and the human rights act to private life, given these wide exemptions to your duty to confidentiality. I shall seek further advice on the matter but would glad of your comments.

Do you think the public are aware of these massive confidentiality loopholes? Will you make them aware, or is the plan simply to keep quiet about them (which seems to be the policy your letter to me follows) until someone makes a fuss?

I am copying this correspondence to the Foundation for Information Policy Research advisory council (to whom I’m grateful for expert advice) to the Open Rights Group, to a solicitor specialised in data protection matters and to the Quaker Civil Liberties Network (who raised the original concern about census work being outsourced to a weapons manufacturer). I propose to write to my MP and to the Information Commissioner when I have your further reaction and have received further advice.

William Heath

Vann South, Vann Lane, Hambledon, Surrey

SECTION 39 OF THE STATISTICS & REGISTRATION SERVICE ACT 2007:
Confidentiality of personal information
(1) Subject to this section, personal information held by the Board in
relation to the exercise of any of its functions must not be disclosed by—
(a) any member or employee of the Board,
(b) a member of any committee of the Board, or
(c) any other person who has received it directly or indirectly from the
Board.
(2) In this Part “personal information” means information which relates to
and identifies a particular person (including a body corporate); but it
does not include information about the internal administrative
arrangements of the Board (whether relating to its members, employees or
other persons).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) information identifies a particular
person if the identity of that person—
(a) is specified in the information,
(b) can be deduced from the information, or
(c) can be deduced from the information taken together with any other
published information.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to a disclosure which—
(a) is required or permitted by any enactment,
(b) is required by a Community obligation,
(c) is necessary for the purpose of enabling or assisting the Board to
exercise any of its functions,
(d) has already lawfully been made available to the public,
(e) is made in pursuance of an order of a court,
(f) is made for the purposes of a criminal investigation or criminal
proceedings (whether or not in the United Kingdom),
(g) is made, in the interests of national security, to an Intelligence
Service,
(h) is made with the consent of the person to whom it relates, or
(i) is made to an approved researcher.