Basically it says “stuff you, we’re going ahead anyway. And we are going to pay Deloitte to tell you we’re doing the right thing”

Even private sector firms will impose certain standards in order to coerce people to use a new service. Just look at how customer service has changed since the advent of the internet. (Poor) telephone services have been degraded to the point where a poor internet portal becomes an attractive option.

What is disconcerting about this ‘leak’ is not its existence but the lack of any document, note or leak that spells out how anyone, citizen or government agency, will actually benefit from an ID card.

This truly has become a beast with a will to survive contrary to any Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest.

I give confidential security briefings. You leak. He has been charged under section 2a of the Official Secrets Act.

The migration problem is just a subset of the larger problem of the “undeserving” accessing public services. I’m sure that the long term vision involves using these systems to ration public services by excluding the undeserving. It’s just a question of having enough data to identify the target. The recent announcements of free health checks all round, and “we won’t treat the chronically ill if it’s their own fault”, are complementary rather than contradictory.
What else could be meant by the desirable objective of the scheme “improving vetting and barring more generally [than areas covered by CRB checks].(page7)

I was intrigued by the suggestion that hundreds of thousands of people would be given free international travel compliant ID cards to get the scheme up and running. Should make a dent in IPS income stream.

WIBBI ministers had the wit to open this project up to public scrutiny.
Also WIBBI those responsible for wasting millions of public funds could be surcharged a la Shirley Porter.

Apologies for going on…

What’s most troubling is that is should represent a week’s work undertaken four years ago. What on Earth have PA and Ernst & Young been doing?

If this represents the evolved state of thinking after fifty million quid, it’s a scandal.

First, as it’s a leaked document, I suppose that the alleged source department will not comment on its authenticity. It will be no good submitting an FoI request for the original, of course, because an exemption claim would come winging back, citing Section 35(i)(a) and probably, given the tone of the document, Section 36(2)(b)(i).

Second, considering the possibility that it is not genuine… isn’t it worrying that one could so easily believe that it was?

Third, if it is indeed genuine (and reasonably current), how depressing that this far into the policy-making process, the thinking should be such an obnoxious mixture of muddle, authoritarianism, subjectivity and obfuscation.

Wibbi policy documents in this area were openly published, and reflected the excellent advice which has been given many times and in many forums over the last couple of years.

To give three specific examples:

1 – the Crosby review gave rise to the very clear suggestion that public trust in the system could be greatly enhanced if it were designed so that the citizen could verify the details of other card-holders (including, for instance, police officers and government officials). As the No2ID annotation makes clear, this document omits any idea of citizens being able to verify the machine-readable data of other card-holders. Nor does it make clear how citizens would, in practice, verify the ‘identity’ data of non-human counterparties such as enterprises or government departments.

2 – Established best practice in the realm of privacy includes the principle of data minimisation. Don’t hold data you don’t need, and don’t exchange more data than is necessary for the transaction in question. Nowhere does this document reflect this vital and basic principle – so how can we expect that principle to be reflected in the policy, implementation and governance of the scheme?

3 – The word “anonymous” does not appear anywhere in the document. If properly designed, the identity card scheme could be the basis for privacy-respecting, trustworthy assertions of entitlement without the need to disclose identity unnecessarily. Again, this would have a massive effect on public confidence in the scheme – but the document is based entirely on the presumption that proof of identity is the ‘sine qua non’ of the scheme.

The Crosby review, the OECD workshop on identity and privacy, the EPG workshops and other meetings have all exposed UK policy-makers to the principle that the core function of a national ID card system is not “proof of identity” but “proof of uniqueness”. It’s hard to understand what, other than wilful blindness to informed advice, could result in a policy document which, at this stage in the process, makes no mention of this principle.