WRITTEN ON June 30th, 2005 BY William Heath AND STORED IN Identity

I just got in a paper from Brian Gladman (see below). He fears it may come across too trenchant for us to use and offers to “tone it down” but it strikes me as perfectly reasoned and expressed in measured language. He raises difficult points we need to consider.

On the question of trust over intent, for example, he points to the prior experience with the police and DNA:

a) in 1984 the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act made it illegal for the police to retain DNA records taken from people who were not subsequently prosecuted or convicted;

b) in 1985 British police started using DNA fingerprinting and gave assurances that samples would be destroyed unless there was a conviction;

c) during the period from 1985 to 2000 the police retained all DNA fingerprint data in clear defiance of PACE; the government was aware that the police were acting illegally

d) in 2001 this government introduced the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 which included a clause that authorised and retrospectively legalised 15 years of illegal police activity in retaining the DNA records of people who have not been convicted of any crime.

Dr Gladman goes on to explore the risks to honest citizens:

Once every UK citizen’s fingerprints are recorded on the NIR, the police will be able to make NIR fingerprint searches to identify people. Since most honest, law abiding citizens do not take any special measures to avoid leaving their fingerprints around, the end result of this process could easily be that they will end up with the police on their doorstep asking them to explain how it is that their fingerprints have been found at a crime scene. Moreover, since justice is never perfect, a small proportion will fail to convince the police of their innnocence and will find themselves convicted of a crime which they did not commit.

So, he argues, universal police-accessible fingerprint data leads to a direct risk of interrogation and false conviction. Criminals will find it easier to frame people by planting fingerprints, and access to the national ID register will become the easier option for the police and intelligence services, with greater risk of wrongful convictions. So the UK ID cards bill forces honest UK citizens to provide data to the government that creates a direct risk to their safety.

He then flips the whole thing round to look at the question of the thousands of crimes committed each year by bogus officials – people posing as police officers, council workers etc. Why does the government not mention this ID issue?

It would be a gross injustice if Parliament voted for an ID card system that allowed officials to verify citizens but did not allow citizens to verify the identity or authority of officials.

He wonders if home owners and businesses will be able to purchase biometric verification equipment for use with the NIR, or if the identification system is only available to elite clients who pay large sums for it, while ordinary taxpayers can’t use its services. He’s written to his MP (who probably wonders what has hit him…or perhaps he’s used to these by now).

A more-than-keen mathematician, Dr Gladman’s formula for calculating major government IT project costs is to take the cost at first approval and multiply it by Pi – far less work than what we did, but gives a similar result. That’s experience for you. He did run MoD’s £600m/yr communication projects for eight years. Brian_Gladman_ID_paper.pdf